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ABSTRACT 
Intertemporal and Cross-Sectional Substitution in Charitable Giving. (May 2013) 
Derek Welborn 
Department of Economics 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr.  Jonathan Meer 
Department of Economics 
 
This paper focuses on two aspects of matching a project. Using aggregate data obtained from an 
online fundraising platform, DonorsChoose.org, Using a fixed effects regression model to 
control for the time invariant and unobserved characteristics of matches,  we  examine the effect 
that matching a project has on the project receiving a donation .  We also aim to find out the 
effect that matches have on the amount of money of projects that have received funding. We 
expect our results to show that matching a project increases the chances of it receiving a 
donation. We also expect that the match has a negative effect on the amount of money raised 
because would be matchers modify their donation depending on the type of match. Our results 
support the theory of substitution between different charities.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper aims to examine the effect that matching a donation has on the amount of money 
raised by a charity across several time periods. Economists have long been interested in what 
makes people donate their money. In 2009 alone, nearly 304 billion dollars was given to 
charitable causes. 
Most of the existing literature on the topic has been on the effect that matching a donation has on 
the amount of money raised. (Karlan and List 2007 &  Huck and Rasul 2009). The field 
experiments conducted in the two papers have shown that linear matching systems –that is 
donating a certain dollar amount for every dollar contributed by donors result in an increase in 
the overall donations received but a decrease in the amount contributed by the donor as 
compared to non-matched donations. 
The field experiments above have examined only one charitable cause each. The effect that a 
certain match has on similar causes across different time periods has not been examined due to 
the nature of the experiments performed in previous studies. 
We obtained data from DonorsChoose, an online fundraising platform for public school teachers 
that acts as an intermediary between teachers across the United States who need funding and the 
donors. The data consists of aggregate data of the projects (each project corresponds to a certain 
teacher that needs funding), matches and donations from 2007 to 2012. 
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We will be able to see the effect that a match has on the whole environment of charitable giving. 
For example, when a certain donor decides to match a dollar for every dollar contributed to high 
school math classes in Texas, from previous literature we expect the number of donors and 
overall donations to increase. But where do the increased numbers of donors come from? Some 
of them may be first time donors but some of them will also be people who usually donate to 
other causes but donated to this one due to the presence of the match. When the match expires 
the following month and a new project for high school math classes in Texas goes up will it be 
less likely to receive funding due to the previous month’s match? 
We will be able to answer those questions with the data. We will carry out statistical tests for 
significance and run two separate regressions. The first with the amount per day received by the 
charity as our variable of interest which will help answer our first question and the second with 
the probability of getting funded as our variable of interest which will help answer our second 
question. 
Our first question was how the presence of a match affected the  the probability of receiving a 
donation. The response variable was the amount of money received per day by a project. The 
variable of interest for our first question was the match itself. The right hand variables in our 
regression were the number of days since the match began, the number of competitors; all 
matched projects on a given day and all projects on a given day and the number of days and 
months since a project was last eligible for a match. 
Our second question dealt with the impact of matching and whether matching actually brings in 
new dollars or just shifts the dollars from other projects (or a later time period) to the matched 
projects. In order to answer that question we had to examine how money flowed into various 
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projects when matches were live. We could then compare the money flow for the matched 
projects to similar projects that were unmatched at the same time period as well as past and 
future time periods. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODS 
We obtained 3 data sets from DonorsChoose: a projects data set, a donations data set and a 
matching data set. The data sets contained data covering a 10 year period from 2003 to 2012.   
The projects data set consisted of an observation for each project in the 10 year period, the 
project’s characteristics (such as location, subject and grade level), whether the project was 
matched and the start and end dates for when the project was live (when donors could donate to 
that project). Originally we started with 438,234 observations. We dropped 36,452 from 2002 to 
2006 because the data from those years contained incomplete information regarding the project 
characteristics. We dropped a further 14 observations because they contained negative project 
costs and we dropped 1 more observation because it took -1 days to fund. We ended up with 
401,677 observations. 
The donations data set consisted of an observation for each donation made in the 10 year period, 
its characteristics (amount, cash/credit card and donor location) and the day on which the 
donation was made. We dropped 32,459 observations from the data set because we had dropped 
the projects which the donations were made to in the projects data set. We ended up with 
1,770,254 donations. 
The matching data set consisted of an observation for each match from 2008 to 2012, its 
characteristics and a start and end period for which the match was live. We had 1,303 matches, 
each of which could potentially have had numerous projects which met its characteristics. For 
example, if corporation A matches high school math classes in Texas for March 2012, any high 
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school math class in Texas, in March 2012 was eligible. However, meeting all the eligibility 
requirements does not guarantee that a certain project will be matched.  Donor’s Choose decides 
which eligible matches will actually get matched.  Donor’s Choose implements two types of 
matches: 
1. Double Your Impact: A 1:1 linear matching scheme in which the corporate or foundation 
partner donates one dollar for every dollar donated by the public.  
2. Almost Home: A matching scheme in which the corporate or foundation partner donates 
the last $100 of an almost funded project. 
Using Stata, a data analysis and statistical software, we merged the project data set and the 
donations data set since they had a unique identifier, the project id, in common. Each project had 
a start date and an end date and each donation had a date on which it was made. After merging 
the two data sets we ended up with a panel in which each project had an observation for each 
donation that was made to the project. 
We then coded the matches onto the merged project-donation data set so that for each project we 
had its various characteristics, the donation characteristics, the day the donations were made and 
all the matches that the project was eligible for. Having the matches that it was eligible for even 
though it was not matched would provide a control group for the effects of matching. For 
example comparing the money raised by two math high school classes when both were eligible 
for a match and only one was matched. 
We had all the matches that a project was eligible for by criteria only, not by date. The dates 
provided to us to Donor’s Choose were inaccurate and were just a rough start and end point to 
the dates. 
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There were 332 matchers; a matcher was defined to be the donor who contributed to the match. 
The 332 matchers combined for 409 matches. 55 of the 332 were donors who matched more than 
one project. If a project met the criteria it was matched. Each of the 409 matches was further 
divided into match criteria id of which there were 1,303. Match criteria ids were subsets of the 
matches themselves they met all the criteria of a match but had extra criteria to distinguish 
themselves from other match criteria id. An example of a match would be donating to all third 
grade math classes, which met certain poverty thresholds in Texas. A third grade math class in 
Austin that met those criteria may have a different match criteria id than a third grade math class 
in Dallas even though both are part of the same match. 
Using the donations data we individually isolated all the donations made by each of the 332 
donors from the donations data. For the 277 donors who had one match we took the first match 
they made to be the start date. For the 55 multiple time matchers, we sorted the donation dates 
for each individual, deleted the donations made on the same day and created a variable that 
counted the days between donations. In most cases the days between donations would range 
from 0-12 then there would be an observation with a days since value in the hundreds we 
assumed that to be the start date for other matches the donor started. After obtaining all our start 
dates for every match from each donor, we merged those start dates into the donations file. We 
assumed that the donation made on the date before the long gap that we assumed to be our start 
date was our end dates. 
We then had a file containing all 400,000 projects, all the matches each project was eligible for 
(by criteria) and the dates that those matches were live. The file contained 5,419,455 
observations. 
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We then took a random 10 % sample of the number of projects. All the results we infer will 
come from this 10% sample. Using the 39, 723 projects in our 10% sample we created an 
observation for each for each day that a project was live and got 3,244,972 observations.  Our 
reason for taking only a 10% random sample was due to tractability. With only a 10% sample we 
had 3 million observations.   
Using the sample we created a number of variables. And for our final sample our main 
independent variables were as follows. 
a. Number of days the project has been live and its square 
b. An indicator for whether the project was eligible for a match on that day 
c. The total number of other matched projects active on that day 
d. The total number of other projects active  
e. Days  and months since the last eligible match 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
The effect of a project being matched has an effect on how much money is raised by a project. 
Matching and lead donor treatments (Huck and Rasul [2007]) have been found to have different 
effects on the probability of giving and the amount of giving. Therefore, our first variable of 
interest is the probability of receiving a donation on a given day. Our model took the form 
 
(1) Ait =  β0Di + β1Di
 2+ β2Mit + β3MatchedProjects + β4AllProjects + β5DSi+ β6DSi
 2
 + 
β7TimeEffects + β8Projecti + ui 
 
Where Mit is an indicator equal to 1 if project i received a donation on day t and 0 otherwise. t 
being the number of days that a project was live. Ait represents the amount of money raised by 
project i on day t. Taking the log of Ait allows us to only consider projects that received 
donations. Di signifies the number of days that a project i has been live. DSi signifies the number 
of days since the last eligible match, with those that never had an eligible match dummied out. 
Mit is a dummy variable that is 1 when the project i was matched on day t. MatchedProjects is a 
categorical variable that divides the projects that were matched into quintiles based on the 
number of matched projects that were live were on day t. AllProjects is a categorical variable 
that divides the all projects on day t into quintiles based on the number of projects that were live 
on day t.  TimeEffects is a categorical variable that gives the effect of each month by year. The 
Projectsi variable refers to the fixed effect for each project that control for unobserved 
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heterogeneity by controlling for any time invariant effects for each project.  It holds the projects 
unobserved characteristics such as the pictures of the children or the message by the teacher 
fixed. Ui refers to the error term. 
Our aim is to find out how the probability of receiving a donation by a project is affected by our 
variables of interest. We begin by examining the effect that the number of days that a project is 
live has on the probability of receiving a donation by a project. We expect to observe that the 
longer a project is the more likely that it will get funded for a variety of reasons. The longer a 
match lasts the more likely it is “seen” by a larger number of people some of whom would make 
a donation also people who make a donation might encourage their friends in the future to donate 
to the project. 
The number of days effect is positive and significant. Projects that have been live for a longer 
period of time have a larger probability of receiving a donation on any given day. The length of a 
project is associated with .02 percentage point more likelihood of receiving a donation. The 
number of days squared effect is positive and significant. Projects that have been live for a 
longer period of time have a larger probability of receiving a donation on any given day. The 
length of a project squared is associated with .0004 percentage point less likelihood of receiving 
a donation. 
Although the days squared coefficient is significant it’s negligible. The days squared variable 
was included to give us insight into how the number of days that a project was live affect the 
probability of the project receiving a donation. The positive function tells us that increasing the 
number of days on a project increases the likelihood of getting funded. The negative coefficient 
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on the days squared variable tells us that the effect of increasing the number of days is an 
increasing function that decreases as time increases. 
The days and the days squared variable could be collinear and as such their coefficients would 
not be significant. We ran a joint f-test for the significance of the 2 variable. The results show 
that the number of days since a project was posted is highly significant. 
We know that the longer a project lasts the more likely it will receive a donation but we are 
interested in estimating the effect that an extra day has on the probability i.e. the marginal effect 
at the mean.  . 
Our results showed that, evaluated at the mean, each additional day the project is live makes it 
.02 percentage points more likely to receive a donation on a given day and our result is highly 
significant. 
The next coefficient on table one is the match. The match was a dummy variable that was 1 if the 
project was matched and 0 otherwise The coefficient tells us that projects are .4 percentage 
points more likely to receive a donation on days they are matched than on days they are not, all 
else equal. A project has a 2.8 percentage point change of being matched. The coefficient of 
match is about 15% of our baseline measure. The effect of being matched is significant. 
In the original data set we had for each project the total number of matched projects available on 
each day. We then created a categorical variable that divided the total number of matched 
projects available into quintiles. The effects of which would give us the effect that the amount of 
matched competitors for a donation has on the probability of receiving a donation on a given 
day. The results in table one show that a project with the most matched competitors (18,235 to 
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24,260) is .8 percentage points less likely to get a gift relative to a project facing the least 
competition from other matches (0 to 87), all else equal. 
Because the quintiles of other matched projects are related and could be collinear we used an F-
test to test for joint significance. The results show that the categories are significant. 
We then decided to test whether the categories are statistically different from each other in order 
to see whether our coefficients in table 1 would hold.  The results show that the second and fifth 
quintiles are not statistically different from each other. All other quintiles are statistically 
different from each other.  
From our original data set we had a variable for each project total number of projects (regardless 
of whether they were matched) on that day. We then created a categorical variable that divided 
the total number of projects available into quintiles. The effects of which would give us the 
effect that the amount that all competitors for a donation has on the probability of receiving a 
donation on a given day. The results in table one show that a project with the most matched 
competitors (23,131 to 26,982) is .26 percentage points less likely to get a gift relative to a 
project facing the least competition from other projects (20 to 12,762), all else equal. Therefore 
the more competition a project receives the less likely it is to receive a donation. 
As with the previous set of possibly collinear indicators we ran an F-test to test for joint 
significance. The results show that the indicators are statistically significant. 
The next coefficient in table 1 is daysbef and its square. The daysbef variable measures the days 
since the last eligible match for each project with projects that never had eligible matches 
dummied out. As with the number of days that the match was live, the daysbef variable has a 
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positive effect while its square had a negative effect. This tells us that the longer it’s been since 
you were eligible for a match, the more likely you are to get a gift (though at a decreasing rate). 
We then tested for joint significance of the daysbef and its square as well as testing for the 
marginal effect of the each additional day that a project was not eligible for a match as we did 
with the variable a number of days a project has been live. The results from the two tables show 
that the daysbef and its square are significant and that, evaluated at the mean, each additional day 
that has elapsed since the last match for which that project would have been eligible increases the 
probability of getting a donation by .0035 percentage points. While this is statistically 
significant, it’s extremely small.  
We include the number of months since the last eligible for each project with projects that never 
had eligible matches dummied out. The results show that each additional month that has elapsed 
since the last match for which that project would have been eligible increases the probability of 
getting a donation. 
Our second question dealt with how much money a project raised on a given day conditional on 
it getting funded on that day.  We modeled our equation as follows. 
(2) Log(Ait) =  β0Di + β1Di
 2+ β2Mit + β3MatchedProjects + β4AllProjects + β5DSi+ β6DSi
 2
 + 
β7TimeEffects + β8Projecti + ui 
Log(Ait) refers to taking the natural log of the amount project i receives on day t. Log(Ait) was 
used because it running a regression with with it as our response variable only runs regressions 
on projects that received greater than 0 funding all projects that received funding. 
The results of our second regression are in table 1. 
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The number of days effect is positive and significant. Projects that get funded and have been live 
for a longer period of time tend to receive a higher donation on average.  The length of a funded 
project is associated with 1 percentage increase in the log of the donation amount which 
corresponds to a 1.107 dollar increase per donation. The number of days squared effect is 
negative and not significant. 
The days and the days squared variable could be collinear and as such their coefficients would 
not be significant. We ran a joint f-test for the significance of the 2 variable. The results show 
that the number of days since a project was posted is highly significant. 
We know that the longer a project lasts the more likely it will receive a donation but we are 
interested in estimating the effect that an extra day has on the amount received by a project.  
Our results showed that, evaluated at the mean, each additional day the project is live makes 
increases the log of the donations .98 percentage points on a given day and our result is highly 
significant which means that each additional day a match is live adds an additional dollar to the 
amount raised. 
The next coefficient on table one is the match.  The coefficient was not significant. The five 
coefficients on the indicator variables for all eligible matched projects that received funding were 
insignificant as well. 
We ran an F-test to test for joint significance. And saw that the variables were not significant. 
The quintiles of the projects that received donations covered lower ranges and as a result we 
could not infer from them. 
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The next coefficient in table 1 number of days since the last eligible match for each project with 
projects that never had eligible matches dummied out. As with the number of days that the match 
was live, the number of days since the last eligible match for each project variable has a positive 
effect while its square had a negative effect. This tells us that the longer it’s been since you were 
eligible for a match, the more likely you are to receive a larger donation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
Using a combination of different data sets from DonorsChoose we were able to obtain a unique 
data set which contained all the projects, the matches they were eligible for and the amount of 
money they raised for each day. We took a 10% random sample of the data for tractability 
purposes and the results and conclusions from our paper are based on the 10% random sample. 
We have estimated the effect that matching a donation has on the probability of charitable 
contributions to a project.  We find that the effect is very significant which confirms the previous 
studies and field experiments done regarding the effects of matching on fundraising. 
Other factors that were found to affect the probability of receiving a match are, the amount of 
days that a project has been live, the longer a project is active the more likely it is to receive a 
donation. Also, competition was found to have a negative effect on receiving a donation as was 
expected with many projects competing for a limited amount of dollars. 
Our results show that it is a worthwhile endeavor for charitable causes to seek matchers because 
the matches increase the likelihood of receiving a donation. A further question that remains 
unanswered is whether a match truly brings in more money or just shifts money from projects 
that would have been funded. We hope to be able to answer those questions with our data set. 
 
 
 
18 
 
REFERENCES 
Huck, Steffen and Imram Rasul. “Comparing Charitable Fundraising Schemes: Evidence from a Natural 
Field Experiment.” B.E, Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 10(1), Article 31 
 
 
Karlan, Dean and List, John. “Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large 
Scale Natural Field Experiment. The American Economic Review, Vol 97, No. 5 (Dec. 2007) pp. 
1744- 1793  
 
Reinstein, David. “Does One Charitable Contribution come at the expense of another?” The BE 
Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
TABLES 
Table 1: Fixed Effects Regression Results 
 
 
Probability of a Project 
getting funded 
Conditional on getting funded 
amount of money raised  
 
OLS Regression with 
Fixed Effects OLS Regression with Fixed Effects 
   Number of days that project has 
been live 0.000*** 0.010*** 
 
(-0.0002699) (-0.0101078) 
Number of days that project has 
been live squared -0.000*** 0 
 
(-0.000000435) (-0.00000194) 
Whether a project was matched or 
not on a given day 0.004*** -0.028 
 
(-0.0043287) (-0.027924) 
First quintile of matched projects 0 0 
 
(.) (.)    
Second quintile of matched projects -0.005*** 0.023 
 
(-0.0045574) (-0.0231818) 
Third  quintile of matched projects -0.003*** 0.038 
 
(-0.0027018) (-0.0383846) 
Fourth quintile of matched projects -0.003* 0.014 
 
(-0.0034234) (-0.0135915) 
Fifth quintile of matched projects -0.008*** 0.084 
 
(-0.008243) (-0.0843184) 
First quintile of all projects 0 0 
 
(.) (.)    
Second quintile of all projects -0.001 -0.064 
 
(-0.0010436) (-0.0637067) 
Third quintile of all projects -0.005*** -0.063 
 
(-0.004588) (-0.0628523) 
Fourth quintile of all projects -0.004*** -0.004 
 
(-0.0041252) (-0.0039594) 
Fifth quintile of all projects -0.003 -0.044 
 
(-0.0026606) (-0.0440135) 
Days since last eligible match 0.000*** 0.004*** 
 
(-0.0000629) (-0.0042465) 
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Days since last eligible match 
squared -0.000*** -0.000*   
 
(-0.0000000931) (-0.00000317) 
_cons 0.045** 7.289*** 
 
-0.0453457 -7.288646 
 
 
